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ESTABLISHING “ENEMY COMBATANT” AS POLITICAL RHETO-
RIC: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAS FRAMED THE 
CONVERSATION ON WARTIME PRISONERS 
By PAUL ALEXANDER 
The White House administration of George W. Bush faced a crisis when an 
attack was committed on United States territory in September of 2001. As a 
result, the administration has initiated a "War on Terror" in which they have 
disregarded the Geneva Conventions and placed a huge amount of authority 
in the role of the president in determining who is classified as an "enemy 
combatant." This paper specifically addresses the use of the term "enemy 
combatant" as a rhetorical device which the administration has used to 
make a moral statement about prisoners of war. Using George Lakoff's con-
cept of frames, the paper shows how this phrase communicates a moral 
value to convince the U.S. public that these "combatants" deserve whatever 
punishment the U.S. might choose to impose, up to and including torture.  
 
Introduction 
“The President has unquestioned 
authority to detain enemy 
combatants, including those who 
are U.S. citizens, during 
wartime.” William J. Haynes II, 
General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, 
memorandum dated December 
12, 2002 
 The White House administra-
tion of George W. Bush has been 
tasked with an overwhelming pro-
ject as a response to the attacks 
that took place on United States 
territory in September of 2001. 
Congress has granted the president 
certain specific powers as a part of 
what is now being called a “War 
on Terror”. However, the President 
and his administration have inter-
preted these powers too broadly 
and this has resulted in the Presi-
dent and members of his admini-
stration violating international law, 
specifically the Geneva Conven-
tion. This document governs how 
prisoners taken in wartime are to 
be treated and classified, including 
the protocols and processes that 
determine how this is to happen. 
When the president took the “un-
questioned authority” to designate 
“enemy combatants”, he ignored 
the process laid out in the Geneva 
Convention for determining the 
status of those captured in war. 
 
 In fact, the very existence of a 
category called “enemy combat-
ant” can be called into question. 
Although a general concept of an 
“enemy combatant” can be implied 
by the Geneva Convention, the 
specific nomenclature and inter-
pretation that has emerged under 
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Bush's administration is nowhere 
to be found in the documents. That 
terminology emerged when the 
administration decided to “sub-
sume” (Haynes, 2002) two prior 
legal classifications for enemies in 
wartime, “lawful” or “unlawful” 
combatants, under the umbrella of 
the “enemy combatant”. The dis-
tinction between these two classi-
fications is important as it decides 
how a captured prisoner will be 
treated and held. Geneva Conven-
tion III, Part I, Article 5 describes 
the following: 
Should any doubt arise as to 
whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and 
having fallen into the hands of 
the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 
4, such persons shall enjoy the 
protection of the present 
Convention until such time as 
their status has been determined 
by a competent tribunal. 
By ignoring this statement, deny-
ing tribunals, and acting as sole 
authority on the designation of 
POW status, the president and his 
administration appear to be in vio-
lation of the Geneva Convention. 
These actions have been justified 
by the administration in two ways: 
legally and morally. Legal chal-
lenges to detention under “enemy 
combatant” status have been ar-
gued before the Supreme Court. 
Additionally, as a linguistic term 
“enemy combatant” has come to 
imply ideological and moral values 
which are essential to the admini-
stration for justifying illegal and 
unjust detention of captured pris-
oners to the American public. 
 
 Existing literature explores the 
legal ramifications of the admini-
stration's decision to detain so-
called “enemy combatants”. I in-
tend to focus on the concept of 
“enemy combatant” not only as a 
legal (or non-legal) phenomenon 
but also as a piece of political 
rhetoric aimed to justify the deten-
tion and torture of accused terror-
ists at the whim of the Bush ad-
ministration. By employing this 
particular piece of rhetoric, the 
Bush administration has been suc-
cessful in convincing the Ameri-
can public, and perhaps some judi-
cial authorities, that the detention 
of prisoners can be done indefi-
nitely, without charges, and with-
out access to legal counsel. In or-
der to break down the concept as 
rhetoric, I will examine the histori-
cal usage of the term “enemy 
combatant”, especially within the 
Bush administration after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks and during the 
“War on Terror”. I believe that the 
context in which the term was 
originally used will provide useful 
insights into the intentions of the 
administration when dealing with 
the identification and detention of 
accused terrorists. In addition, I 
will examine the term as a frame, a 
2
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concept developed by linguist and 
cognitive psychologist George La-
koff to uncover how politicians use 
language to associate issues or 
ideas with particular moral values. 
In this case, “enemy combatant” is 
a frame that has been used to iden-
tify anyone who is detained as po-
tentially dangerous and deserving 
of whatever conditions the U.S. 
might impose upon them. 
 
Method of Analysis 
 There are four major areas of 
literature that will be the focus of 
this investigation. The first is 
scholarly work that has been writ-
ten regarding “enemy combatants” 
and their detention. Much of this 
work (Cole 2002, Yuu 2003, 
Priester 2004, Stumpf 2004, Sloss 
2004) focuses on the role of the 
judicial branch in adjudicating 
cases involving people captured 
and held outside of U.S. territory1. 
I will briefly summarize and ex-
plain the prevalent arguments and 
the response of the Bush admini-
stration to legal challenges. Addi-
tionally, I intend to show that 
while scholarly and legal chal-
lenges are important and effective, 
they fail to establish a competing 
rhetoric to the “enemy combatant” 
                                                 
1 The detention center at Guantanamo 
Bay, of course, provides a problematic 
situation for lawyers wishing to intervene 
on behalf of their clients as the U.S. 
government argues that courts have no 
jurisdiction there because it isn't 
technically a U.S. territory. 
legal and moral system already es-
tablished by the Bush administra-
tion. 
 
 The second area of literature 
will encompass publicly available 
documents that show how the 
Bush administration developed the 
thinking behind “enemy combat-
ant”. First, I will explore the legal 
and ideological predecessor to 
Bush's contemporary assertion of 
authority by examining the Su-
preme Court case Ex parte Quirin, 
a case which sent six men to their 
death under dubious circum-
stances. Additionally, I will ana-
lyze documents that advise the 
president as to his legal authority 
(Gonzalez memo) or attempt to es-
tablish the legal justification for 
the administration's actions 
(Haynes memo). My goal in dis-
cussing these documents is to es-
tablish the administration's think-
ing behind their actions. While I 
don't expect it to be laid out clearly 
in the text, it is my hope that I can 
infer some sort of motivation from 
an analysis that puts different 
documents in conversation with 
one another. 
 
 Public speeches, radio ad-
dresses, and press conferences will 
constitute another area of literature 
investigation. Through these I will 
be able to trace the historic emer-
gence of the “enemy combatant” 
term. I am especially interested in 
3
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the context in which it is evoked. 
For example, is it used as a primar-
ily legal term in discussions focus-
ing on the legality of actions taken 
by the U.S. or is it used by the 
President in political speeches in-
tent on rallying the American pub-
lic behind a particular cause? 
Where was the term first used and 
who used it? Can this be correlated 
with other memos or actions that 
emerged around the same time? 
 
 Finally, I intend to bring UC 
Berkeley linguist George Lakoff's 
work in conversation with the idea 
of an “enemy combatant”. Lakoff 
developed the idea of linguistic 
frames to explain how conserva-
tive movements in the U.S. have 
been particularly effective at asso-
ciating moral themes and values 
with the ideas that are espoused in 
their speech. Terms such as “tax 
relief” and “tort reform” are exam-
ples of conservative frames. The 
power of such terms is that they 
form a base around which both 
progressive and conservative ar-
guments end up being framed. 
Progressives cannot argue against 
“tax relief” without using the term, 
thereby lending the idea credence 
and reinforcing it with the public. I 
recognize that this paper may fall 
into that trap as well and I will re-
flect on that and offer some sug-
gestions for moving forward as a 
part of my conclusion. 
 
Legal Defenses 
 Various lawyers have lashed 
out against the Bush administra-
tion's grab at power in relation to 
the denial of habeas corpus for 
U.S. citizen prisoners, the distinc-
tion made between treatment of 
U.S. citizen prisoners and alien 
prisoners, and the use of secret 
military tribunals to try and con-
vict captured prisoners. Addition-
ally, the Bush administration has 
presented lengthly legal defenses 
of their actions in regards to pris-
oners and the Geneva Conven-
tions. I will briefly sketch the com-
ponents of each argument here in 
order to highlight some of the suc-
cesses that the human rights re-
gime has enjoyed as well as iden-
tify areas where their work could 
be improved. In addition, I will 
provide some counter arguments 
as the legal debate is very conten-
tious and the human rights view-
point is not the only voice speak-
ing out. 
 
 David Cole wrote about the dif-
ferentiation in the way that the 
U.S. treats prisoners captured as a 
part of the “War on Terror” de-
pending on whether or not they are 
U.S. citizens. He cautions against 
disregarding the liberties of immi-
grants in favor of security despite 
the obvious need for a rigorous ex-
amination of security in the wake 
of the September 11 attacks (Cole 
2002:1004). Cole is able to look 
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back at other times in U.S. history 
when prejudice and stereotypes 
controlled our response and be-
lieves if we are cautious then per-
haps we won't have to look back 
upon this time with regret. Juliet 
Stumpf examines similar themes 
and also believes that we need to 
be cautious in the way that we pro-
ceed when handling alien combat-
ants (Stumpf 2004:139). 
 
 John Yuu and James Ho, on the 
other hand, are supportive of the 
treatment and classification system 
used by the Bush administration. 
They conclude that the “armed 
conflict” in which the U.S. is en-
gaged is not against a group that 
can be a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions and thus the U.S. re-
sponse should be to classify cap-
tured prisoners as unlawful com-
batants and deny them the right to 
prisoner of war treatment (Yuu and 
Ho 2003:228). Yuu will later go on 
to denounce the position taken by 
the Bush administration in regards 
to their justification of torture of 
Guantanamo prisoners. Although I 
lack the legal pedigree that Yuu 
does I disagree with his reading of 
the Geneva Conventions, as I will 
explain below.  
 
 David Sloss explored the Rasul 
vs. Bush case that was heard be-
fore the Supreme Court and found 
that the defense provided by the 
U.S. government was “untenable” 
as it relied in part on international 
law such as the Geneva Conven-
tions and also in part on common 
law that was established prior to 
and superseded by the Conven-
tions (Sloss 2004:798). Benjamin 
Priester disagrees as he believes 
that the Geneva Conventions sup-
port a classification of unlawful 
combatant which would allow the 
Bush administration to detain, try, 
and punish captured prisoners who 
were members of the Taliban and 
al Qaida (Priester 2004:7). 
 
 Throughout the various legal 
battles, arguments against the Bush 
administration's decisions regard-
ing the Geneva Convention and 
were strongly made. Unfortu-
nately, they were made on purely 
legal grounds, often ignoring the 
history of the concept of “enemy 
combatants”. I hope to add to the 
strength of these arguments by ex-
amining some of the rhetorical and 
other non-legal reasons that the 
Bush administration adopted the 
policies it did. 
 
Origin of the Enemy Combatant 
 It is impossible to talk about the 
contemporary use of military 
courts to prosecute detained al-
leged terrorists without looking 
back upon the historic Supreme 
Court case which the Bush admini-
stration is using as a basis for their 
new legal outlook on wartime 
prisoners. In  
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the 1942 case, Ex parte Quirin, 
eight accused saboteurs who had 
traveled from Germany to the U.S. 
in U-boats with orders to blow up 
aluminum manufacturing plants 
were caught by the FBI, tried by a 
military tribunal, and then six of 
them were sentenced to death and 
promptly executed. This happened 
despite the fact that all of the men 
had once lived in the U.S., many 
for long periods of time. In addi-
tion, the only reason they were 
caught was because two of the 
saboteurs were intent on defecting 
to the U.S. by turning themselves 
and the other saboteurs into the 
FBI. Despite the fact that the FBI 
had no knowledge of the saboteurs 
before one of the group turned 
themselves in, the presentation to 
the media was such that it ap-
peared the FBI had been staked out 
on the beach just waiting for the 
enemy to show up. The tribunals 
were created on order of President 
Franklin Roosevelt and bypassed 
any chance that the men would 
have their case tried in a civilian 
court. 
 
 The military tribunals were 
used in part to shroud the case in 
secrecy so that the image of the 
U.S. and FBI as vigilant and suc-
cessful at infiltrating German op-
erations could be presented to and 
maintained with the public. In ad-
dition, it is thought that Roosevelt 
was convinced from the beginning 
that the accused saboteurs must be 
put to death, regardless of the out-
come of the trial, and the  tribunal 
was used to insure this result. The 
Army-appointed defense lawyer in 
the case, Col. Kenneth Royall, 
fought vigorously to have the trial 
moved to civilian court but failed 
in his appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The entire process was over 
quickly, taking only six weeks 
from the time the men were cap-
tured, and the Supreme Court did 
not deliver an opinion on the case 
until twelve weeks after the sabo-
teurs had already been executed. 
The justices involved would later 
show regret over how the case was 
handled (Dobbs 2004:B04). 
 
 It is this case, one that holds 
dubious standards of justice, that is 
being used to justify the contempo-
rary decision of the President to 
hold and try “enemy combatants” 
in military institutions rather than 
civil ones. Further, the President 
relies on a similar rhetoric to es-
tablish that the prisoners being 
held at Guantanamo Bay as “en-
emy combatants” are deserving of 
their fate: harsh and cruel treat-
ment, punishing interrogations, 
and periods of detention that have 
stretched into years without any 
indication that the prisoners will be 
accused or tried. For the Bush ad-
ministration, the Ex parte Quirin 
case establishes both a legal and 
rhetorical precedent for achieving 
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the result that the President wants 
to see, regardless of whether jus-
tice is being served. 
 
 The specific term “enemy com-
batant” actually originates in this 
case. In the following quote we 
can see its only usage in the entire 
judgment: 
By universal agreement and 
practice the law of war draws a 
distinction between the armed 
forces and the peaceful 
populations of belligerent nations 
and also between those who are 
lawful and unlawful combatants. 
Lawful combatants are subject to 
capture and detention as 
prisoners of war by opposing 
military forces. Unlawful 
combatants are likewise subject 
to capture and detention, but in 
addition they are subject to trial 
and punishment by military 
tribunals for acts which render 
their belligerency unlawful. The 
spy who secretly and without 
uniform passes the military lines 
of a belligerent in time of war, 
seeking to gather military 
information and communicate it 
to the enemy, or an enemy 
combatant who without uniform 
comes secretly through the lines 
for the purpose of waging war by 
destruction of life or property, 
are familiar examples of 
belligerents who are generally 
deemed not to be entitled to the 
status of prisoners of war, but to 
be offenders against the law of 
war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals. 
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
[1942]) 
Interestingly, when read the way I 
think it was intended, enemy com-
batant as it is used here does noth-
ing but refer to an individual fight-
ing for the enemy in a time of war. 
It does not establish an additional 
legal category beyond lawful and 
unlawful combatants that were, at 
the time the opinion was offered, 
outlined in the laws of war from 
the Hague Convention. These 
categories were refined in the Ge-
neva Convention, as discussed 
above, which was signed after the 
conclusion of World War II. 
 
 Further, the Supreme Court in 
this case refer specifically to ene-
mies crossing into the territory of 
the U.S. and abandoning their uni-
forms in order to commit acts of 
violence or destruction: 
By passing our boundaries for 
such purposes [acts of war] 
without uniform or other emblem 
signifying their belligerent status, 
or by discarding that means of 
identification after entry, such 
enemies become unlawful 
belligerents subject to trial and 
punishment. (Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1 [1942]) 
Because the Court is so specific 
about belligerents' characteristics 
and the nature of their actions, it 
would be difficult to use this case 
as legal precedence for combatants 
who were captured on a field of 
battle outside of U.S. territory. 
However, that is exactly how the 
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case is being used by the Bush 
administration. 
 
Characterizing the Enemy, 
Establishing Authority 
 Beginning with a Presidential 
military order issued on November 13, 
2001, the Bush administration began a 
systematic process to establish the 
President as the sole authority for 
determining who would be considered a 
POW amongst those captured in the 
“War on Terror”2. The order, among 
other things, states that the president has 
the authority to determine who will be 
held and tried within military 
institutions, so long as they are 
associated with al Qaida and pose a 
threat to the nation. The criteria are 
broad and subject to a huge variance in 
interpretation and, again, the final arbiter 
of decisions is the President. The 
President establishes that these people 
will be tried through military tribunal 
with proceedings held in secret. Further, 
the order amazingly disallows persons 
who fall into this category any sort of 
remedy in U.S. courts, foreign courts, or 
courts with an international jurisdiction. 
The order establishes these rules without 
justifying a legal framework which 
might allow such sweeping powers to be 
bestowed on the President. Instead, the 
Bush administration invoked fear and a 
state of emergency as the justification 
for implementing the order. The 
language used includes “if not detected 
and prevented, will cause mass deaths, 
mass injuries, and massive destruction of 
property, and may place at risk the 
continuity of the operations of the 
                                                 
2 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/print/20011113-27.html 
United States Government,” “To protect 
the United States and its citizens,” “the 
danger to the safety of the United 
States,” and “considered the magnitude 
of the potential deaths, injuries, and 
property destruction that would result 
from potential acts of terrorism.” Despite 
the “danger”, the order will only apply to 
non-citizens who are accused by the 
President. 
 
 The day after the military order was 
issued, Vice President Dick Cheney 
spoke at a meeting of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce3. He spoke on the war in 
Afghanistan and “tax relief” and after his 
remarks took a few questions from the 
gathered businessmen. The final 
question asked what the difference was 
between the tribunals established in the 
military order from the previous day and 
other established procedures in the 
Hague. Cheney refers to the Ex parte 
Quirin case in defense of the order and 
also says that the order would only apply 
to individuals coming into the U.S. for 
the purpose of “killing thousands of 
innocent Americans, men, women, and 
children”. Because of this, he says, 
“They don't deserve to be treated as a 
prisoner of war” as they would be 
considered “unlawful combatants”. 
 
 On November 29, 2001 the President 
addressed a gathering of lawyers at the 
U.S. Attorneys Conference, saying that 
the U.S. Attorneys are on the “front line 
of war”4. In his speech, the President 
refers to “unlawful combatants who seek 
                                                 
3 Vice President Addresses U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/20011114-6.html 
4 President Says U.S. Attorneys on Front 
Line in War: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/20011129-12.html 
8
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to destroy our country and our way of 
life.” This obviously continues to invoke 
ideas of fear and emergency within the 
country. Immediately after this statement 
the President asserts his sole authority to 
handle accused terrorists saying, “if I 
determine that it is in the national 
security interest of our great land to try 
by military commission those who make 
war on America, then we will do so.” 
Interestingly, the president positions the 
lawyers in the center of the war and, as 
we have seen, the role of lawyers in the 
Attorney General's office was significant 
in attempting to establish the legitimacy 
of the President's powers and the use of 
torture against detained prisoners. 
 
 One day prior to Bush's address at 
the lawyers conference, two attorneys, 
Griffin Bell and former Attorney 
General William Barr, gave testimony to 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
who had convened in a meeting titled, 
“Department of Justice Oversight: 
Preserving Our Freedoms While 
Defending Against Terrorism”5. In both 
of their testimonies, the attorneys 
referred to prisoners as “enemy 
combatants”. This is the only use of this 
specific term found in official records 
between September 11, 2001 and June 9, 
2002 and it was done by people 
ostensibly outside of the Bush 
administration. Both lawyers argued 
fiercely that it is in the President's 
authority as granted by the constitution 
to proceed with trials by military 
tribunals for members of al Qaida or 
other terrorist organizations. 
 
                                                 
5 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our 
Freedoms While Defending Against 
Terrorism: 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id
=126 
 By January 9, 2002 discussion of 
detainees and combatants had reached 
the White House press conferences6. On 
that day, Ari Fleischer took a question 
regarding “prisoners of war”. He 
immediately countered that prisoner of 
war is a legal term established in the 
Geneva Conventions and is something 
that needs to be established on a case-
by-case basis. The reporters present 
press him on exactly what international 
convention the U.S. was holding people 
under, with one reporter stating, “Under 
the Geneva Convention and other 
conventions we've signed, there's no 
such thing as a detainee -- either they're 
prisoners of war -- and even though they 
may not, some of them may not have 
had the insignia, I mean, by all legal 
understandings, they are prisoners of 
war.” Fleischer continues to defer to 
individual legal proceedings as being the 
determinant of who is or isn't a prisoner 
of war but it fails to satisfy the reporters 
who are pressing the legitimacy of 
holding prisoners from Afghanistan 
halfway around the world from where 
they were captured. Fleischer eventually 
takes a question that changes the subject 
and leaves the reporters' concerns 
unresolved. 
 
 Nineteen days later, on January 28, 
Ari Fleischer again met with the press 
and discussed the detainees in 
Guantanamo7. The difference in his 
response to questions between the two 
conferences was dramatic. In the later 
conference, Fleischer answered 
questions with ease, drawing from an 
                                                 
6 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020109-5.html 
7 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020128-11.html 
9
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obviously prepared position to present a 
strong argument for the legitimacy of 
detainee treatment by the U.S. He stated, 
“the detainees who are being held in 
Cuba, the determination has been made 
that they are not and will not be 
considered POWs.” This determination 
was made on the advice of the 
President's counsel and directly 
contradicts the statements made just 
three weeks prior by Fleischer himself. 
Fleischer's answers were much longer 
and better thought through than in the 
previous conference. Additionally, 
Fleischer does not attempt to dodge 
questions at all and instead simply sticks 
to the assertions that, we will find out 
later, were established by attorneys. 
Finally, it is important to note that the 
terminology being used here is still 
“detainee” or “illegal combatant” rather 
than the “enemy combatant” phrase 
which comes into use later. 
 
 One day prior, on January 28, 
President Bush had addressed the press 
with Chairman Hamid Karzai of the 
Afghan Interim Authority8. The first 
question asked by reporters was in 
regards to formally applying the Geneva 
Convention to detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay. The President asserted that he had 
applied the Geneva Convention, later 
going on to say that the Geneva 
Conventions are not outdated and that 
the U.S. has adhered to the “spirit of the 
Convention.” The president, much like 
Fleischer, asserted that the prisoners are 
“illegal combatants” and as such will not 
be afforded prisoner of war status. 
 
                                                 
8 Remarks by the President and Chairman 
of the Afghan Interim Authority Hamid 
Karzai: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020128-13.html 
  On February 7, President Bush 
issued a memorandum to his 
administration that made clear the 
position he was taking in regard to 
detainees' rights as prisoners of war9. In 
the memo, he detailed a plan that would 
prevent the application of Geneva 
Conventions to those who were being 
held by the U.S. The President concurs 
with the lawyers working for the 
Department of Justice which found that 
it was within the President's authority to 
make such determinations regarding 
prisoner status, in effect granting himself 
the authority to suspend the Geneva 
Conventions. In the memo, Bush refers 
to a “new paradigm” that the U.S. must 
operate in, one “ushered in not by us, but 
by terrorists”. Language that invoked “a 
new kind of enemy” was common when 
the administration spoke about fighting 
the new “War on Terror”. Of course, 
along with a new kind of enemy comes a 
new way of doing things. In this case, 
the hand of the President has been forced 
to suspend the Geneva Conventions not 
because he wants to but because the 
terrorists have forced him to. The 
language used to refer to prisoners is still 
either “detainee” or “unlawful 
combatant”. 
 
 Something interesting happens after 
this memo is released. Any discussion of 
“combatants” or “detainees” disappears 
from Presidential speeches, Q&A 
sessions, press releases, and press 
conferences. When the discussion does 
pick up again the term used to discuss 
prisoners has changed. In a memo 
produced on June 9, 2002 President 
Bush ordered Secretary of Defense 
                                                 
9 Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees: 
http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/
020207_bushmemo.pdf 
10
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Rumsfield to hold José Padilla as an 
“enemy combatant”10. The order 
identified Padilla as a “grave threat” to 
the safety of the U.S. and placed him in 
the custody of the military. The very 
next day In a press conference held by 
Ari Fleischer, Padilla is referred to as an 
“enemy combatant” rather than a 
detainee or unlawful combatant. Padilla, 
who was being held in a military brig in 
the U.S., is a U.S. citizen charged as a 
material witness in the September 11 
terrorist attacks. Eventually the Supreme 
Court found that it was Congress and not 
the President who has specific powers 
that could be used to detain a U.S. 
citizen and deny them the right of 
habeas corpus. 
 
 This sweeping trace of the 
administration's official discussion of 
prisoners captured in the early stages of 
the “War on Terror” is revealing. It is 
obvious that President Bush initially 
decided to move forward under the 
premise that he had the sole authority to 
order military tribunals for captured 
prisoners without any kind of formal 
legal justification for doing so. Three 
months after his initial military order 
outlining the treatment and prosecution 
of detainees, he followed with an order 
that, not surprisingly, relied on his 
administration's lawyers to legitimize his 
authority. Throughout the 
administration's discussion, we can see 
how images of fear, danger, and 
emergency were invoked to quash any 
kind of resistance that might arise as a 
reaction. This allowed the President to 
                                                 
10  Memo from Pres. George W. Bush 
to U.S. Sec’y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
RE Jose Padilla designated an enemy 
combatant: 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdoc
s/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf 
selectively ignore the Geneva 
Conventions when they did not support 
his initial goal of prosecution at his 
discretion in military tribunals and he 
was able to do so with little resistance 
from the press or public. In the end, this 
allowed the Bush administration to 
invent a category of wartime prisoner, 
the so-called “enemy combatant”, which 
has no legal meaning or merit and 
contradicted the administration's own 
characterization of prisoners that was 
used for the nine months following the 
September 11 attacks. The press became 
complicit in its usage as they parroted 
the phrase back when asking questions 
or referring to the Guantanamo Bay 
prisoner situation. While the term has no 
legal merit, its widespread acceptance 
provided the administration with a 
rhetorical victory, one which insured that 
challenges to their prisoner paradigm 
would fail not based on legal standing 
but because the term framed the 
discussion in such a way that it would 
become difficult to talk about prisoners 
without supporting the administration's 
rhetoric. 
 
Framing the Wartime Prisoner 
Conversation 
 One way that we can attempt to 
break through such powerful rhetoric is 
to examine the way in which the Bush 
administration and conservatives in 
general strategically frame the 
conversation on wartime prisoners. 
George Lakoff, a linguist and cognitive 
psychologist at UC Berkeley, has 
developed a method for analyzing the 
language and rhetoric used in politics in 
order to determine the underlying values 
inherent in catch phrases that are 
constantly employed by politicians. He 
argues that the conservative movement 
in the U.S. has been dominant in recent 
11
Alexander: Establishing Enemy Combatant as Political Rhetoric: How the Bush
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2006
CS&P  PAUL ALEXANDER 33 
 
CS&P  Vol 5 Num 1  December 2006 
 
years because of a long-term investment 
in establishing think tanks that could 
create linguistic strategies that would 
force progressives to debate issues in 
conservative terms, thus reinforcing 
conservative values and ideals even 
when arguing against them (Lakoff 
200?:27). 
 
 This works through frames, or pieces 
of rhetoric that evoke a particular image 
when their literal meaning often belies or 
contradicts the actual message. “Tax 
relief” is a good example of this. The 
term tax relief frames taxes as something 
that people need relief from rather than 
an essential investment in infrastructure, 
welfare, etc. Another example is “death 
tax” where the frame points to a dead 
person, a loved one, being taxed after 
they have passed rather than the living 
recipients of the dead one's estate. The 
“War on Terror” is perhaps the most 
prominent and dangerous frame as it 
evokes images traditionally associated 
with war, such as a battlefront, invasion 
or defense, surrender and victory, that 
simply cannot exist in a war against a 
band of loosely connected individuals. 
Further, the phrase promotes the idea of 
fighting fear itself even when the tactics 
used by the U.S. consist of campaigns of 
terror, otherwise known as shock and 
awe, that affect the innocent members of 
nations where the “War on Terror” is 
waged. 
 
 The Bush administration spent a 
great deal of time and energy on creating 
a frame for prisoners captured in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The frame is 
based on a legal misnomer but is still 
effective at conveying ideas that make 
sense, especially to the U.S. public. 
“Enemy combatant” is a term that 
invokes fear of an enemy, someone 
determined to destroy the way of life 
that most people in the U.S. hold dear. 
Additionally, it is not the same enemy 
that the U.S. has faced in the past, 
perhaps during the Cold War, the 
Vietnam War, or World War II. 
According to the administration, this 
new enemy has forced the hand of the 
President and made him do things that 
he doesn't want to do, such as suspend 
the Geneva Conventions for captured 
enemy fighters. When this frame is 
placed upon a person, that individual is 
immediately labeled as a combatant and 
shown to be ready to fight, they were 
fighting when they were captured, and it 
would be dangerous to release them 
because they would continue to fight and 
again would threaten the safety of life in 
the U.S. 
 
 A competing frame needs to be 
introduced into this conversation, a task 
that could be taken up by the human 
rights regime that has been so vigilant in 
observing and fighting for the rights of 
prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay and 
other U.S. prisons positioned around the 
globe. Although I haven't completed a 
comprehensive analysis, I believe that 
continuing to use “prisoner of war” to 
describe these prisoners would be an 
effective frame to employ. It directly 
contradicts the goals and arguments that 
the Bush administration has presented 
when trying to decide how to treat and 
handle the prisoners. At its most basic 
level, the phrase is a very accurate 
description for these individuals as they 
are literally prisoners taken during an 
acknowledged war. It also reflects an 
established piece of international law 
which is very widely accepted and 
understood in both the mind of the 
public and international politics. Further, 
it will make it difficult for the Bush 
12
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administration to talk about the prisoners 
without acknowledging the idea that 
they are, in fact, prisoners of war. 
 
 Of course, putting the term into use 
would require the cooperation of 
progressive politicians and journalists 
alike. It would have to be a conscious 
movement but I believe that it is not one 
lacking momentum. Lakoff's push for 
progressives to re-frame the political 
conversations taking place has picked up 
steam and he has recently consulted with 
various politicians on their campaigns in 
an attempt to further the re-framing of 
political debate in the U.S. It's hardly a 
comprehensive answer but it would chip 
away at a powerful piece of rhetoric that 
has enabled the President to seize power 
that does not rightfully belong to him 
and has resulted in detention that ignores 
the Geneva Conventions and has failed 
to bring to trial or charge hundreds of 
prisoners for several years. 
Conclusion 
 
 Recently, more attention has been 
placed on the Bush administration's 
actions in regard to prisoners. A staff 
editorial in the New York Times recently 
attacked Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzalez for his threats to “muzzle” the 
press. As part of their defense, they said 
that Gonzalez could do many things if he 
truly respected the rule of law, stating, 
“He could uphold the Geneva 
Conventions and the U.N. Convention 
Against Torture, instead of coming up 
with cynical justifications for violating 
them. He could repudiate the disgraceful 
fiction known as 'unlawful enemy 
combatant,' which the administration 
cooked up after 9/11 to deny legal rights 
to certain prisoners.” (New York Times 
2006:26). 
 
 Actions such as these are promising 
for remedying the situation for prisoners 
held unlawfully in Guantanamo Bay and 
other U.S. prisons. At the very least, 
they begin to re-frame the conversation 
around prisoners and move toward a 
more accurate and just framework for 
handling the hundreds of people we have 
incarcerated without an opportunity for 
release or trial. The human rights regime 
has moved us to this point, vehemently 
arguing for the legal rights of prisoners 
who most lawyers wouldn't dare to get 
near. I believe that the next step will be 
to capture the public imagination by 
breaking down exactly what has 
happened at Guantanamo and exposing 
the rhetoric used by the Bush 
administration to legitimize their actions. 
As a first step, I have examined the 
origins of the term “enemy combatant”, 
tracing its roots back to the World War 
II Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin. 
I then traced how the Bush 
administration took this concept and 
evolved it to fit their desired outcome: a 
President who had the sole authority to 
decide how prisoners would be tried and 
punished. Finally, I examined the idea of 
“enemy combatant” as a linguistic frame 
and offered some ways to possibly re-
frame the conversation on prisoners of 
war. It is my hope that this contribution 
will help others move beyond the image 
painted by the Bush administration and 
see that our fear is moving us to deny 
those things which are fundamentally 
important to the U.S.. 
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